Wickham-Crowley, Timothy P. 1992. Guerrillas & Revolution in Latin America: A Comparative Study of Insurgents and Regimes since 1956.

This book is a work of comparative sociology that postulates a theory about why some 20th century Latin American insurgencies succeeded and others failed. It does this by analyzing the set of insurgencies in two waves: the first being the Cuban-inspired focos that took place between 1956 and 1970 and the second being the post-foco movements that took place between 1970 and 1990. Wickham-Crowley codes the entire set of cases (312), but goes into detailed explanations of a smaller subset. In the first wave, he compares Bolivia, Colombia, Cuba, Guatemala, Peru and Venezuala. In the second, he compares Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, Peru, and Colombia. The cases are all compared using a standard set of variables: Peasant Support, Guerrilla Military Strength, Patrimonial Praetorian Regime, Loss of US Support, and Social Revolution, which are further broken down and explored in the text.

The result of his analysis is that "revolutionaries came to power in Latin America from 1956 to 1990 only when a rural-based guerrilla movement secured strong peasant support in the countryside and achieved substantial levels of military strength; if that movement also faced a patrimonial praetorian regime (a.k.a. mafiacracy), then it was structurally pressured to seek, and succeeded in securing a cross-class alliance against the patrimonial dictator who, lacking the social bases of support to resist such an alliance, in the end fell to a national resistance; under such conditions the United States tended to withdraw support from the dictatorship because of the symbolic and social pressures exerted by the constitutionalist and electoral symbols under which the revolutionaries and their more moderate allies united." (320)

Wickham-Crowley also finds there are three variants for failed insurgencies: "In variant A, the guerrillas did indeed secure substantial peasant support in the countryside, but popular support alone was not enough to carry them to victory. They faced an unweakened form of political regime -- either an electoral democracy or a collective military dictatorship -- and failed in their attempt. Military strength is irrelevant, and US support for the regime simply falls out of the analysis and becomes irrelevant to the outcome. Why? Because some of these regimes retained US support, while some lost it, yet all of them defeated or at least have stood off the insurgents." (322)

"In variant B, the guerrillas usually assayed attempts against stronger regimes supported by US backing and failed. Peasant support was absent in every one of these cases, either because the peasantry was unwilling to do so, or because no revolutionary movement seeking such support made an appearance. Guerrillas here also lacked substantial military might, in any event. The cases for this variant where guerrilla movements were present included Argentina, Peru, Bolivia, and various lesser focos of the 1960s, and Brazil and Mexico in the 1970s." (322)

"Variant C is a most interesting case, for it contains every case of a patrimonial praetorian regime that did not fall to revolution: Nicaragua (1958-1963), Haiti, Paraguay (twice), and Panama under Manuel Noriega. In the absence of a strong guerrilla movement (either absent or weakly supported guerrillas), those regimes did not succumb to revolution, and US support for the regime once again becomes irrelevant to the outcome." (322-323).

While the conclusions are compelling, it is the work on each of the variables that comprises the bulk of the book. And that can get mind-numbing in a hurry, but fortunately Wickham-Crowley has a penchant for the use of handy explanatory charts. So for peasant support check out pg. 261, for Regime Weaknesses look at pg. 279, and for levels of US support look at pg. 85.

Dudley, Steven. 2006. Walking Ghosts: Murder and Guerrilla Politics in Colombia. Routledge Press: New York.

This book is an account of the life of Colombia’s Patriotic Union (UP) Party. Born out of peace negotiations between the FARC and the Colombian government in 1982-83 (26-27), it quickly grew in popularity as Colombians embraced the chance to end their decades long civil war between Communist organizations (FARC [Marxist], ELN [Maoist], M-19 [urban Marxist] (87-88). Tragically, it inspired the creation of the para-military organizations that eventually became the AUC, and its members were systematically killed en masse (130). The organization struggled to distinguish itself from the FARC and reject the doctrine of struggle by all available means (legal and illegal), but to no avail – its members were abandoned by the FARC, who used the party both as an opportunity to expand its army and a martyr for future combat and were relentlessly persecuted by the military and the AUC. With the demise of the leading candidates of the Socialist Left the party disintegrated (165-166), although the shell of the organization carried on, still under constant threat, until the government electoral commission concluded that it lacked support and struck it from the rolls (230).

The book itself is well-written, as Dudley is a journalist by trade, and so writes with a story-tellers flair. At times he repeats information, and the editors let more typos slip by than they should have, but it’s a quick and worthwhile read. For me, it highlights a couple of interesting (and sad) phenomena. First, it confirms my belief that, given the relatively low cost of weapons, any organization with a solid income base can maintain a capacity for violence perpetually. So the FARC was not brought to heel by the government, but it also lacked the popularity (or the government lacked the brittleness) to completely take over the Colombian state. So a bloody conflict persists wherein both sides are locked in a stalemate. Second, it provides additional evidence for my fear that “peace-makers” tend to get killed at alarming rates in these conflicts. The UP became a lightning rod for both intellectuals and activists tired of violence and for anti-Communist sentiment. And so when the UP tried to reject violence and fully embrace the political process, it was ruthlessly destroyed, because, while it had supporters, it had no army. And the track record of good-will vs. bullets is uninspiring. These two facts then make me continue to ponder the difficulties in created peaceful settlements between warring parties – cause creating alternatives seems to be a good way to get the pacific leaders in society killed, but speaking only to the parties in conflict reinforces their identity claims. It’s all very difficult. And a touch depressing.

In summary – good book, should be read for factual background and not as theory or a general study of the conflict, but can be read quickly and easily.